Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, informational rents, and procurement management by Mohnen, P. et al.
  
 
Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs,
informational rents, and procurement management
Citation for published version (APA):
Mohnen, P., Flambard, V., & Laserre, P. (2004). Snow removal auctions in Montreal: costs, informational
rents, and procurement management. (UNU-MERIT Research Memorandum Series; No. 023). Maastricht:
UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and
Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2004
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 
 
MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational Rents, 
and Procurement Management 
 
Véronique Flambard, Pierre Lasserre and Pierre Mohnen 
 
 
  2004-023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MERIT – Maastricht Economic Research 
Institute on Innovation and Technology 
 
PO Box 616 
6200 MD Maastricht 
The Netherlands 
T: +31 43 3883875 
F: +31 43 3884905 
 
 
http://www.merit.unimaas.nl 
e-mail:secr-merit@merit.unimaas.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
International Institute of Infonomics 
 
 
c/o Maastricht University 
PO Box 616 
6200 MD Maastricht 
The Netherlands 
T: +31 43 388 3875 
F: +31 45 388 4905 
 
http://www.infonomics.nl 
e-mail: secr@infonomics.nl 
Snow Removal Auctions in Montreal: Costs, Informational
Rents, and Procurement Management
Véronique Flambard, Pierre Lasserre, and Pierre Mohnen
Grant MacEwan College, Université du Québec à Montréal
and Maastricht University.
October, 2004
Abstract
Using semiparametric and nonparametric estimation techniques we infer cost distributions and
informational rents from 457 snow removal contracts o¤ered for tender by the City of Montreal. Our
results are compatible with standard received theory of competitive auctions: there is a positive
correlation between costs and bids, and rents increase with the variance of costs. Bids and costs have
decreased over the sample period while rents remained relatively constant. The City deserves credit
for these results, as it has succeeded in exploiting economies of scale and triggering innovations
while maintaining competition. Further, it has been successful in adjusting its reserve prices to
keep up with the decreasing cost of snow removal.
Key words: Procurement auction, semiparametric and nonparametric estimation, in-
formational rents, task design, municipal contracts.
JEL Classication: D44, H400
Please address all correspondance to Veronique Flambard, Department of Economics, Grant MacEwan College, City
Centre Campus, 6-329 10700-104 Avenue, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, T5J 4S2, Tel. (780) 497- 4794, Fax. (780)
497-5308, Email: ambardv@macewan.ca.
1 Introduction
Snow removal is an important activity for the City of Montreal. Approximately 2,000 kilometers of
streets and 3,500 kilometers of sidewalks are cleared after each snowstorm. Every year, on average
7,500,000 cubic meters of snow are removed and carried to snow dumps. The budget for snow removal
was $52 million in 1998, accounting for about 3% of the total budget of the City. Considering the high
cost of snow removal, the City wants to make sure that it buys outside services at minimum cost; it
needs to know fairly accurately the contractorsactual costs. One way to get this information is for the
City to carry out some of the work itself, as it does, while contracting out the rest to private suppliers.
This kind of benchmarking has its limits, however, because a municipality is often less e¢ cient than
the private sector in providing public services.
It is well known that, under conditions which include symmetry among bidders and the absence
of collusive behavior among suppliers, appropriate auctions insure that the most e¢ cient supplier is
selected and that the rent left in the hands of that supplier by the auctioneer is minimized, given the
number of bidders. One may wonder then, why it is desirable to know more about contractorscosts.
One important reason is that the denition of the service to be contracted out may substantially
a¤ect its cost. For instance, the mapping and the size of the territories specied in the contracts a¤ect
the scale of snow-clearing and the distance to the snow dumping site. Knowledge of such repercussions
may help the municipality streamline its snow removal and transportation operations.
A second important reason is that the size of the territories may trigger innovations. Contractors are
given time limits to clear school and hospital areas after a snowstorm, therefore the larger the territories
the more e¢ cient the machinery has to be.
Finally, a third important reason to seek knowledge of contractorscosts and rents is that rational-
ization of the work being auctioned out may have an impact on competition in the auctioning process.
The City may for instance redene its territory subdivisions in such a way as to reap economies of
scale and induce technological progress. An extreme case would be to have one single territory and
delegate the activity to a single supplier. Such a practice, however, is likely to a¤ect market structure.
When comes the time to renew the contract (say every ve years), fewer rms would be big enough to
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participate, but there would also be fewer territories to compete for. Therefore the level of competition,
and the rent that the winning rm could reap from the contract, would be a¤ected1 . This suggests a
potential trade-o¤ between competition and economies of scale.
We propose to infer the contractorscosts, and the rents they obtain, using an econometric model
of auction bidding applied to data on private bids for snow removal contracts auctioned o¤ by the
City of Montreal on 61 procurements between 1990 and 1998. Existing theoretical results on bidding
strategies, bidding rents and optimal procurement rely on the unknown distribution of private values
(private costs in the present context). Empirical work is therefore needed to evaluate the performance
of such a procurement mechanism and to provide insights into ways to improve upon it. Our work is
a contribution in this direction. From a theoretical model, adapted from Riley and Samuelson [1981],
we derive a structural econometric model from which the contractorscosts, cost distribution and rents
can be computed.
The estimation raises several econometric issues, which have been examined by Paarsch [1992],
Donald and Paarsch [1993, 1996], Florens, Hugo and Richard [1997], Krasnokutskaya [2002], Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer [2003] and Flambard and Perrigne [2004] in the context of procurements and
by La¤ont and Vuong [1993], Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong [1994], La¤ont, Ossard and Vuong
[1995], Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong [2000] and Li, Perrigne and Vuong [2002], in the context of sale
auctions. We adapt the Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong [2000] procedure to a procurement mechanism.
This method has the advantage of being fully nonparametric, so that it does not impose any functional
form on the unknown distributions. However, to avoid the curse of dimensionality in high dimensions
with nonparametric estimation, we introduce a variable reduction technique to model the heterogeneity
of the auctioned contracts instead of keeping to the main explanatory variable for characterizing the
contracts as is usually done. Researchers have developed methods which reduce the dimensionality
in regression methods and have allowed for partly parametric modeling. The resulting models can be
grouped together as so-called semiparametric models. Relying on this literature (see Horowitz[1998])
1We do not discuss here the possibility of regulating a sole supplier (a monopoly) on the basis of its cost, without
re-auctioning the contract regularly, because municipal law requires that any services, above a given expenditure, be put
up for auction.
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we have chosen to use a single index model. The latter o¤ers the advantage to fully exploit the relation
between the dependent variable (the bids for us) and the independent variables (the characteristics
of the contracts here) instead of merely exploiting the correlation within the vector of independent
variables like with other methods. Since we are interested in studying the relationship between the
service to be performed (and in particular the mapping and the size of the territories) and the resulting
bids, we found the semiparametric modeling for the regression of the bids conditionally on the contract
characteristics particularly interesting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional features and our assumptions
for the present study. A game-theoretic model of procurement auctions, where rms compete on price,
is developed in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the identication of the structural elements and to
the description of the estimation procedure. The results of the estimations are reported and analyzed
in section 5. Finally, we summarize and conclude the paper in section 6.
2 A Description of the Auctioning of Snow Removal Contracts
in Montreal
Every year, the City of Montreal publishes an invitation to tender for several snow removal contracts,
corresponding to di¤erent territories of the City. The contracts are standardized and di¤er only with
respect to the characteristics of the territories. Firms interested in submitting bids request specications
from the City. For each contract, the City provides a map, a description of the territory (length and
distance to the snow dump) as well as (after 1990) the reserve price. On the day of the auction, the
sealed bids are opened and the identity of all bidders and their bids are announced to those present.
The contracts under auction have ve year terms and put the winner in charge of cleaning up snow
from the streets and sidewalks between November 15 and March 15 (the snow season) during these
ve years, at the agreed price.
Participants bid on the price, in dollars per meter of street length per year, based on a normal
snowfall of 200 centimeters per year. The lowest bid is accepted for each contract provided that the
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specied qualications are met: the candidate must have the required equipment and must provide
adequate nancial warranties. In the course of contract execution, the price may be adjusted to allow
for abnormal snowfalls. The price paid to the rm is increased by 0.4% for each centimeter above 200
centimeters; similarly, the price is reduced by 0.4% for each centimeter of snowfall below 200 centimeters
down to 100 centimeters. Consequently, for a winning bid pil by rm i in contract auction l; the yearly
amount ail received in dollar per meter of street length, is2 :
ail = :6pilIfq100g + [1 + :004(q   200)] pil1I(q > 100) (1)
where q is the actual snowfall during the year under consideration. As a result, the supplier is certain to
receive at least 60% of the revenues corresponding to a normal snowfall of 200 centimeters at the bidded
price, but shares with the City the risk associated with yearly uctuations above 100 centimeters.
Total revenue to the rm is the product of total street length in the territory (in meters) by yearly
amount ail. Although prices are quoted in the same units from one contract to the other, each bid
can be di¤erent, not only because auctions on di¤erent territories are independent, but also because
territories have di¤erent characteristics that a¤ect the cost per meter. The City of Montreal requires a
list of pieces of equipment for each territory. The supplier has to prove that he has the required capital.
If he does not have all of it before the auction, he has to commit himself to buy the other pieces before
the beginning of the contract.
We have data on the winning and losing bids, together with contract specications, for 61 procure-
ments of snow removal tendered between 1990 and 1998 by the City of Montreal, for a total of 457 bids.
The number of bidders varies across auctions from two to fourteen.
Table 1 gives an overview of the main trends. Winning bids for snow removal contracts with the
City of Montreal have gone down by 22% between 1990 and 1998. One possible explanation for this
decline, as we will see in section ve, is the returns to scale associated with the increase in territory size
and technological progress. Since the contracts have ve year terms, the policy of increasing territory
2Usually it snows well over 100 centimeters a year (the average over the last 20 years was 206.6 centimeters). For
the last ve years the precipitations were between 179 and 327 centimeters. The lowest level of snowfall ever was 87.5
centimeters in the winter of 1979-1980 while the lowest level in our dataset was 131 centimeters.
4
size could only be introduced progressively. On a given year, any new territory division can apply only
to territories under renewal and can be o¤ered only to the cohort of contractors whose current contracts
are expiring. Transition technicalities and other historical features account for the fact that, over our
1990-98 sample period, one-quarter of the contracts are up for renewal each year for four years while,
the fth year, no procurement auction is organized (1994). This illustrates some of the constraints
applying to changes in territory size shown in Table 1.
Another explanation for the decline in bids might be increased competition. If the pool of potential
suppliers in the Montreal area remains constant as territory size increases and the number of territories
diminishes, then the number of participants in Montreal has to increase at each auction. However,
changes in territory size may induce some suppliers to seek other work. We shall examine which of the
two explanations is most likely to prevail.
In Table 1, we also present the chronological evolution of the number of contracts, the number of
bids and the resulting average number of bids per contract. We notice a reduction of 3 contracts in
1991 for the cohort of contracts awarded in 19863 and renewed in 1991 and a reduction of 2 contracts
in 1993 for the cohort of contracts awarded in 1988 and renewed in 1993.
There is no systematic pattern in the number of actual bidders for each successive contract within a
given cohort. It dropped sharply in 1996. It shooted up from 6.67 in 1992 to 10.83 in 1997. It remained
at the same level between 1993 and 1998, and it increased in 1995 compared to 1990. In Table 3, we
present some descriptive statistics for the sample period (1990-1998).
3 The Procurement Auction Model
We shall set up a model of procurement auctions based on assumptions which we consider to be realistic
in the institutional context under study. The observed data on bids and winning bids are supposed to
be generated by this model. Together with the characteristics of the contracts they will allow us to infer
the contractorsprivate costs and informational rents. The model will also help us assess the e¤ects
3Even though we have data on snow removal auction after 1986, we estimate the rmsrents and costs using only the
auctions with a reserve price (which was introduced in 1990) over the period 1990-1998.
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on costs and rents of increases in territory size and other management decisions. We rst turn to the
assumptions underlying our model.
3.1 Institutional Details and Model Assumptions
Reserve Price. In 1990, a public reserve price p0l for contract l was introduced. We observe no drop in
the number of bidders after 1990 compared to the period before 1990. The mean number of participants,
during the period without a maximum price, was 7.54 with a maximum of ten, whereas, during the
period with a reserve price, the mean was 8.26, with a maximum of fourteen participants. However,
many bids are close to the reserve price. To evaluate the proportion of bids that could be truncated
because of that, we have estimated nonparametrically the probability to draw a bid within plus or minus
ve percent of the reserve price for an average tract. We found that it is quite high and equal to 0.19.
Therefore we will assume that the reserve price is binding in our period of study.
Knowledge structure. We assume that the set of potential bidders is common knowledge and that
it is constant and equal to I4 . Firm i knows its own cost but only the distribution of the cost of its
competitors. Agentsprivate costs are assumed to be independently drawn from a common distribution
on

cl; cl

with density function fl(): This stochastic structure is common knowledge. It is likely that
individual costs di¤er across bidders because of di¤erences in capital stock (number, age and type of
machines), expertise, preferences for a territory (rms specialize in di¤erent types of territories or may
have a¢ nities with the municipal team), capacity utilization (which depends on the other commitments
of the rm) and location (a rm must rent a parking space if the territory is too far away). We assume
that the bidders know from personal experience and from visiting the auctioned territory how much it
would cost them to realize a particular contract. To the extent that individual cost di¤erences are more
important than uncertainties about the task which a¤ect all rms symmetrically, the bidding process
is best modeled as an independent private-values (IPV) procurement auction.
Risk, symmetry, independence. Because rms typically obtain numerous contracts from several
4The reserve price is binding and therefore the number of actual bidders Il varies with the reserve price. However,
the number of potential bidders I is independent of the reserve price.
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municipalities, carry out other activities or can rent their equipment5 , we may assume them to be risk
neutral at the level of a single auction. Discrimination, e.g. in favor of Montreal suppliers, in the award
of procurement contracts, is prohibited; we assume that all bidders are otherwise indistinguishable, so
that each rm is treated alike. More specically, we assume that we dont have groups of rms with
systematic cost di¤erences (say low cost rms and high cost rms) with respect to their size, location6 ,
capacity of production7 or work experience for example.
A rms cost for performing a given task may change over time because of new capital acquisition,
new experience, di¤erences in auctioned territories or di¤erences in alternative opportunities. Costs
are assumed to be independently distributed over time. Moreover, we assume that the shape of the
distribution does not change over time, only the interval over which it is dened. Consequently, the
auctions are treated as a succession of independently repeated games.
We may also reasonably consider that the bids are independent across auctions in a given year.
Indeed, although a rm may bid on several contracts, it cannot do so with prior knowledge of any
auction outcome; thus it cannot bid conditionally on the results of other auctions. The maximum
number of contracts it can win depends on its capital stock and on the number of nancial warranties
it must provide with its bids.8 If a contractor bids on, and wins, more contracts than he can ultimately
deliver, the City decides which ones he will eventually retain given his capacity. Since such ex post
assignment is done in such a way as to minimize the Citys cost rather than to maximize the bidders
rent, the latter is not likely to win by using, in a specic auction, any strategy involving other auctions.
Also, a rm is not able to benet from economies of scale or scope from contracts with neighboring
5Some rms buy extra equipment on purpose, usually when these machines can be used in the out-of-snow season, to
rent them to townships because of the very good return associated with this practice.
6The location may create asymmetry on western tracts but not on eastern tracts (see Flambard and Perrigne [2004]).
As a matter of fact, Flambard and Perrigne nd slight di¤erences in rents and cost densities between the rms close to and
far away from the western tracts. However, when performing a Smirnov-Kolmogorov test, they nd a weak rejection of
stochastic dominance on western tracts (and a strong rejection on eastern tract). Therefore, in the absence of asymmetry
on eastern tracts and in the absence of denite evidence of asymmetry on western tracts, we assume that the bidders can
be treated in the same manner. Moreover, the estimations would be less robust given our relatively small sample sizes if
we estimated the densities of bids separately for each group of bidders Gj(bil)8j = 1; 2 and this lack of robustness would
outweigh the potential benet of considering di¤erent groups of bidders.
7The capacity of production cannot be measured by counting only the snow removal contracts with the City of Montreal.
Other commitments such as rental contracts and snow removal contracts with other municipalities or customers would
also need to be considered but we dont have this information. Moreover, rms indicate the maximum number of contracts
they wish to win. Therefore, rms cant win more contracts than they are able to undertake.
8Each bid must be accompanied by a deposit and by a warranty issued by a Canadian insurance company of an amount
corresponding to 60% of the value of the contract.
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territories: removing snow on one territory cannot reduce the cost on neighboring territory because the
terms of the contract require that a rm which has two (or more) contracts must get all the required
equipment simultaneously on each of the territories it is responsible for. Therefore, there is no gain,
and no risk, from bidding at several auctions.
Finally, the City of Montreal is not the only town which solicits bids for snow removal, and snow
removal is not the sole activity of the rms involved. Over the year there are numerous invitations
for tender, rms often bid simultaneously with several towns for many contracts, and they enter other
types of contracts with other customers. Globally, rms win the number of contracts they wish (with
one or several municipalities). Consequently, we shall consider that the procurement auctions for snow
removal are individually independent auctions.
Competition. The demand for snow removal is relatively price insensitive, as public opinion is in favor
of clearing the streets. For instance, initiatives by the City of Montreal to reduce overtime expenditures
by suspending snow removal on weekends has raised public criticism. However, as is plain from the
above discussion on independence, there are many buyers, many suppliers, many products, and the
rules do not facilitate the control of any market or auction procedure.
Prohibiting bidders from using the same equipment on neighbouring territories, as does the City
of Montreal, limits the benet of a collusion for territory assignments. Barriers to entry are low:
rms who handle snow removal also carry out other activities, like landscaping, general construction or
excavation. Their equipment can have many uses, especially their trucks which can be equipped with
removable plows. As a matter of fact, we have identied 52 di¤erent rms bidding for snow removal
in Montreal between 1990 and 1998, some of them entering and others leaving the market. Obviously,
di¤erences among rms, the sheer number of potential entrants, and heterogeneity in the territories
would complicate cartel coordination. For all these reasons, the bidding behavior is modeled as a
noncooperative game under incomplete information.
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3.2 Bidding Strategies
We begin our presentation of the model with an informal discussion of the bidding game. We then
determine its outcome and interpret it.
Consider a buyer(the City in our case) who auctions, in a rst-price sealed-bid auction, several
xed-price contracts to I potential rms (I  2). Although the contracts are relatively homogeneous,
they are not identical. Therefore for each contract l; we allow the distribution of costs to depend on
the characteristics of the contract zl (to be dened in the next section). Let us denote the cumulative
distribution function Fl  F (jzl;   pol), the corresponding density function fl  f(jzl;   pol), the
survival function Sl = 1   Fl ()  S(jzl;   pol), and the interval over which the cost distribution is
dened as

cl; pol
  [c (zl) ; pol (zl)].
Total revenue and total cost depend on the actual snowfall, q. Total cost increases with the level
of snow removal as rms have to operate their equipment and pay their employees for each extra hour
worked. According to the snow-removers that we have interviewed, the costs increase linearly with the
level of snowfall; thus we assume that the cost per centimeter of snowfall is constant. Snow removers
also bear a xed cost, which may di¤er from one territory to another, if only because equipment
requirements di¤er between territories. Thus we write the total cost for rm i in contract l as kil+ vil200q
where kil is the xed cost and vil is the variable cost corresponding to a snowfall of 200 centimeters.
We also dene cil = kil + vil as the total cost corresponding to a snowfall of 200 centimeters. If we
assume that E(q) = 200, the expected prot, conditional on winning the contract, can be rewritten as9 :
9The derivations follow. Given the per meter revenue dened by (1), the expected prot for the winner i of auction l
is:
il =
Z 100
0
h
:6pil   kil  
vil
200
 q
i
(q)dq
+
Z 1
100
h
(1 + :004(q   200))pil   kil  
vil
200
 q
i
(q)dq
where the expectation is taken over snowfall, whose density is (q). If we assume that E(q) = 200, the expected prot,
conditional on winning the contract, can be rewritten as: il = Apil   cil where A is dened as:
A =

:6
Z 100
0
(q)dq +
Z 1
100
(1 + :004(q   200))(q)dq

Because observing less than 100 centimeters of snowfall a year is a rare event, we can assume that
R 100
0 (q)dq = Pr(q 
100)  0:We decided to make this assumption rather than estimate the density (q) because the error due to the omission
of climate change in the estimation might have outweighed the gain obtained from a more precise specication of snow
conditions. It follows that A  1 and then that il  pil   cil:
9
il  pil  cil. According to whether it gets the contract or not, the prot of rm i bidding for contract
l is thus equal to:
il = [pil   cil]  1I(pil < pjl; j 6= i j pil  pol)
Assuming that any two bidders with the same cost would submit the same bid, we restrict the analysis to
equilibria in which all rms have the same strictly increasing and di¤erentiable strategy bl(x). Although
bidders have the same equilibrium strategy function, they di¤er by the argument x at which the function
is evaluated. Riley and Samuelson [1981] have solved the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of such a game in
the context of a sale auction. Let us compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game. Bidder i
with bidding price bl(x) wins if and only if all his rivals have a cost above b
 1
l (bl(x)) = x: In equilibrium,
each player i would want to choose the strategy bl(x) that maximizes his expected payo¤10 :
E(cil; x) = [bl(x)  cil]  SI 1l (x)
The rst-order condition for maximization is:
d
dx
h
bl(x)S
Il 1
l (x)
i
= cil
d
dx

SI 1l (x)

By requiring the observations to correspond to a Nash equilibrium, we must have x = cil, hence
d
dcil

bl(cil)S
I 1
l (cil)

= cil
d
dcil

SI 1l (cil)

: (2)
Solving the di¤erential equation (2) under the boundary condition11 bl(pol) = pol, an optimally chosen
10We rst dene the probability of winning when bidding the amount bl(x) as:
Pr(i wins l) = Pr(bl(x) < bl(cjl); 8j 6= i j zl; x  pol)
= Pr(x < cjl; 8j 6= i j zl; x  pol)
= SI 1l (x)
where I is the number of potential players for contract l. This result holds because of the independence of costs and
because of the monotonicity of bl():
11As a matter of fact, condition (2) is just one of the conditions necessary for equilibrium. Another necessary condition
is that bl(p0l)  p0l be nonnegative. Otherwise, a bidder endowed with a cost p0l could do better by not participating in
the auction. It is also necessary that bl(p0l)  p0l be non-positive. Otherwise, when cil = p0l a small decrease in the bid
from the common strategy bl(p0l) to bl(p0l) ", such that bl(p0l) p0l " > 0, would raise bidder is expected payo¤ from
zero (since SI 1l (p0l) = 0) to some small positive number (because S
I 1
l (b
 1
l (bl(p0l)   ")) 6= 0), and consequently bl()
10
bid bl(cil) must satisfy:
bl(cil) = cil +
R p0l
cil
SI 1l (c)dc
SI 1l (cil)
; i = 1; :::; n (3)
The second-order condition is satised because bl() is assumed to be strictly increasing12 . Note that
this decision rule satises the original assumption of an increasing bid function: the lower a contractors
cost, the lower his bid.
The winning bidder is the contractor with the lowest cost cl(1): In choosing his bid, each agent
assumes he has the lowest cost. We can show that bl(cil) as dened in (3) is equal to the expected
second-lowest cost cl(2) conditional on the bidders information that his own cost is cl(1): The bidder
estimates how far on average the next cost is above his own cost. He then submits a bid that exceeds
his own cost by precisely that amount. Hence, on average, the price reached in a rst-price sealed-
bid procurement auction is the second lowest cost. The second term in (3) can be interpreted as the
informational rent that accrues to the winning bidder. The more potential bidders there are, the lower
is the informational rent and hence the cost to the municipality. Furthermore, the larger the variance,
the larger the di¤erence between the lowest cost and the second lowest cost. The economic rent to the
winning bidder tends to increase with the variance of the distribution as shown in McAfee and McMillan
[1986, 1987].
4 Identication and Estimation of the Structural Model
In this section, we explain how we estimate the theoretical model of section 3, using the method
developed for a sale auction by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong [2000]. The basic idea underlying the
structural estimation is the following. Because bids are related to private costs, which are random and
distributed as Fl () = F (jzl;   pol); by equation (3) bids are also random and have a distribution
Gl() = G(jzl). We denote the distribution of the observed bids (the distribution that can be directly
estimated from the bids and is truncated by the reserve price) Gl () = G(jzl;   pol). Our strategy
would not be the best strategy. These last two restrictions determine the boundary condition bl(p0l) = p0l which implies
that the least e¢ cient participating rm earns zero rent. This condition is not very restrictive insofar as the interval
[cl; p0l] is common knowledge.
12The proof is available upon request.
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is to estimate Gl () nonparametrically and to retrieve Fl (). We can then construct a pseudo-sample
of bidderscosts, knowing the bid distribution and the observed bids, derive the cost distribution, and
compute the informational rents enjoyed by the winning bidders.
The model is identied if the structural elements of the model, the latent cost distribution Fl()
and the potential number of bidders I can be recovered from observations, which are the bids and the
number of actual bidders Il . The rst theorem in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong [2000] provides a solution
to the identication problem. We adapt their result to the context of a procurement auction.
The result relies upon the fact that the strategy derivative b0l(), the cost distribution Fl () and the
cost density fl () can be eliminated simultaneously from the rst-order-condition by introducing the
bid distribution Gl () and the bid density gl () as follows.
Rewrite the rst-order condition (2) so as to obtain:
b0(cil)
fl(cil)
1  Fl(cil)
(Il   1) = bl(cil)  cil: (4)
The distribution of the observed bids Gl () is:
Gl (p) = Pr(bl(c)  pjzl; c  pol) = Pr(c  b 1l (p)jzl; c  pol) (5)
= F (b 1l (p)jzl; c  pol) = F (cjzl; c  pol) =
F (cjzl)
F (pol)
for all p 2
h
p
l
; pol
i
: The density of the observed bids gl () is therefore:
gl (p) =
d
dp
[Gl (p)] =
d
dp

Fl(b
 1
l (p))
F (p0)

(6)
=
1
b0l(c)
fl(b
 1(p))
F (p0)
=
1
b0l(c)
fl(c)
F (p0)
for all p 2
h
p
l
; pol
i
:
Substituting (5) and (6) in (4), we obtain:
1
(Il   1)
1 Gl (pil)F (pol)
gl (pil)F (pol)
= pil   cil
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where pil = bl(cil) is the equilibrium strategy. The strategy derivative b0l(), the cost distribution Fl ()
and the cost density fl () have been eliminated simultaneously. The unknown cost is now dened as a
function of observable variables: the number of bidders, the bid, the density and the distribution of the
observed bids.
We use, hereafter, the notation l(pil) for the inverse of the bid function dened by:
l(pil) = pil  
1
(Il   1)
1 Gl (pil)F (pol)
gl (pil)F (pol)
(7)
for pil 2
h
p
l
; pol
i
:
Proposition 1 Let I  2: Let Gl () be an absolutely continuous distribution dened on the intervalh
p
l
; cl
i
: Then there exists a distribution of bidders private costs such that Fl () is the corresponding
distribution of equilibrium bids in a rst-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and a
binding reserve price if and only if: C1: The bids are independent and identically distributed as Gl () :
C2: The function l() dened in (7) is strictly increasing on
h
p
l
; p0l
i
and its inverse is di¤erentiable
on

cl; p0l
  hl(pl); l(p0l)i.Moreover; whenFl () exists it is unique with support [cl; cl] and satises
Fl (cil) = Gl
 
 1l (cil)

for all i 2 [1; :::; Il] ; l 2 [1; :::; L] (where L is the number of auctions). In
addition, l() is the inverse of the equilibrium strategy bl () : l() = b 1l () :
P roof. Adapt the proof of theorem 1 in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong [2000]. Details can be provided
upon request.
Assuming that the rms behave as predicted by the theory (section 3), proposition 1 establishes that
the latent cost distribution Fl (cil) is identied from the distribution of the observed bids. To estimate
the latter we use a nonparametric statistical method, which avoids picking an arbitrary functional
form to describe the distribution. Our estimator is based on the kernel method (see Härdle [1990,
1991], Simono¤ [1996] or Yatchew [1998]).
To recover the cost distribution from (7), we rst need to estimate the density and cumulative
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conditional distribution functions of the observed bids.
bg(pjzb) = 1Lhgzhgp
PL
l=1
1
Il
PIl
i=1K

z Zl
hgz

K

p Pil
hgp

1
Lhgz
PL
l=1K

z Zl
hgz
 (8)
where f(Pil; Zl)gi=1;:::;I

l
l=1;:::L is the sample of independent observations from the distribution of (P;Z), L
is the number of auctions, Il is the number of observed bidders in auction l, K () is a kernel, and hgz
and hgp are the bandwidths. The characteristics of the auction that we use to estimate the bid density
are denoted z. We use the quarticor biweightKernel dened as :
K(u) =
15
16
(1  u2)21I(j u j 1)
except for the single index where we use a kernel of order 4. As the estimate inherits the properties of the
kernel, we have chosen our kernel such that it is positive, dened on a bounded support and di¤erentiable
everywhere on the support. Our estimate is therefore a positive function, bounded and di¤erentiable.
The choice of a kernel does not really matter for the global accuracy of the estimation so it should
be chosen based on other issues, such as ease of computation or properties of the estimate(Simono¤
[1996]). The bandwidths are determined by the so-called rule of thumb13. We nd hgp = 1:50 and
hgz = 27:92. More information about the kernel and the bandwidths are provided in the appendix.
The conditional distribution G (j) is estimated with the following estimator:
bG(pjzb) = 1LhG
PL
l=1
1
Il
PIl
i=1 1I(pil  p)K

z Zl
hG

1
LhG
PL
l=1K

z Zl
hG
 :
The bandwidth, set by the rule of thumb, is equal to hG = 24:34:
We then estimate the term to evaluate the truncated density and distribution of bids. The number
of potential bidders is unknown with a binding reserve price. A natural estimator for the potential
number of bidders I is bI = max` I` : Using E(I` jz`) = I(z`), and solving for (z`), we obtain for any
13The original rule of thumb was derived assuming that the underlying density was gaussian. But this gaussian reference
rule can easily be converted to a rule based on a quartic kernel function: the constant is then 2.78 instead of 1.06. See
Simono¤ [1996, pages 45-46].
14
value z
^(z) =
1bILhG
PL
`=1 I

`K

z Zl
hG

1
LhG
PL
l=1K

z Zl
hG
 ;
using a kernel estimator for the nonparametric regression.
We can now deduce the pseudo-costs:
bcil = pil   1
(bI   1) 1 G

l (pil)F (pol)
gl (pil)F (pol)
: (9)
The rent for rm i; if it is the winner in auction l; is given by:
drentil = 1
(bI   1) 1 G

l (pil)F (pol)
gl (pil)F (pol)
: (10)
The rent decreases with the number of potential bidders and with the hazard rate.
The contracts for tender in di¤erent parts of the City di¤er by various characteristics: tra¢ c,
road width, territory size, distance to the dump site, and, over time, by the state of the arts in snow
removal. The characteristics zl; the conditioning variables of the bid hazard rate, should account for
this heterogeneity. As we are restricted regarding the number of variables we can use in the estimation,
we have to resort to a variable reduction technique.14
To aggregate the dimensions of x, where x represents the characteristics of the contracts, we use a
single-index model z = x: This implies that the conditional mean function of the observed bids with
respect to the characteristics of the contracts has the form:
E(p j x) = E(p j x) = H(x) (11)
where  is an unknown constant vector of dimension k = 3 (the same dimension as x), H is an unknown
function and the quantity x is called a single-index. The inferential problem in (11) is to estimate both
 and H from observations of (p; x): We further assume that the conditional density and distribution
14Although many estimation schemes, including kernel [...] directly generalize to higher dimensions, practical imple-
mentation lags behind this theoretical fact. [...] It seems likely that the most useful approach for higher dimensional data
is dimension reduction of some sort. (Simono¤ [1996]).
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of the observed bids with respect to the characteristics of the contracts are functions of the same single
index: G(p j x) = G(p j x) and g(p j x) = g(p j x): This approach allows the data to provide
the information on the conditional relation between bids and contract characteristics. This reduction
method is far preferable, say to a principal component analysis that would only exploit the information
provided by the characteristics of the contracts.
To estimate  and H from observations of (p; x), we use a direct semiparametric estimator that
is computationally convenient since it does not require solving an optimization problem and is non-
iterative. The weighted average derivative of the conditional mean function of the observed bids with
respect to the characteristics of the contracts with weight function W , denoted  = E[W (X)@E[pjx]@x ]; is
proportional to . Using this property we are able to estimate  up to a scale and to deduce the function
H. Powell, et al. [1989] give conditions under which b is a consistent estimator of  and L1=2(b   )
is asymptotically normally distributed with mean 0. The estimator of  is observationally equivalent
to  up to scale normalization. The estimator of ; adapted to our dataset where the number of bids
exceeds the number of contracts (since more than one rm bids to win each contract), is:
b =  2
L
LX
l=1
1
Il
IlX
i=1
pil
@fl(xl)
@x
(12)
The characteristics of the contracts, denoted x, form a vector of dimension 3 (x1; x2; x3). Each contract
is characterized by the length of the territory, the distance to the snow dump and a trend variable that
captures technological progress that took place over the period. It follows from standard properties of
kernel density estimators that bfl is a consistent estimator of fl. The formulae for bfl is:
bfl(x) = 1
(L  1)h1h2h3
X
j=1
j 6=l
K(
x1   x1j
h1
)K(
x2   x2j
h2
)K(
x3   x3j
h3
) (13)
In (13), we estimate the multivariate kernel function as the product of one-dimensional kernel functions.
The choice of the kernelK and the bandwidth h = (h1; h2; h3) are explained in the appendix. Moreover,
@fl(xl)
@x is estimated consistently by
@ bfl(xl)
@x : For example, for the derivative with respect to the rst
16
component of the single index:
\@fl(xl)
@x1
=
1
(L  1)h21h2h3
X
j=1
j 6=l
K 0(
x1   x1j
h1
)K(
x2   x2j
h2
)K(
x3   x3j
h3
) (14)
We are then able to construct our single index that aggregates the information about the contracts
as follow:
z = x (15)
Finally, a nonparametric estimate of the cost distribution can be obtained using the pseudo-sample
(bcil; zl) ; i = 1; :::; Il ; l = 1; :::; L. If f(c; z) denotes the joint density of (C;Z) and fz (z) denotes the
marginal density of Z, then the conditional cost density estimator is given by:
bf(cjz) = 1Lhfzhfc PLl=1 1Il PI

l
i=1K

z Zl
hfz

K

c cil
hfc

1
Lhfz
PL
l=1K

z Zl
hfz
 (16)
Using quartic kernel as in (8) and the same rule of thumb, we obtain the bandwidths hfc = 1:52
and hfz = 27:92 for the f function:
5 Results
We apply the nonparametric estimation method outlined in the preceding section to our auction model
and the 457 observed bids for snow removal contracts with the City of Montreal. First, we present the
estimated conditional bid density functions and the inferred conditional cost distributions of the private
contractors. Second, we discuss economies of scale and their exploitation by the City. Third, we turn
to the implicit informational rents earned by the private contractors. Finally, we discuss whether the
reserve price is set optimally or not. In each case, we confront our results with the implications of the
theoretical model, and we evaluate the actions taken by the City from that perspective.
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5.1 Estimated Bid Density and Cost Density Functions
We begin by presenting the estimated bid densities conditional on various levels of the characteristic z.
Figure 2 shows a selected number of estimated bid densities g (jz) plotted side by side 15 . The densities
are unimodal and quite symmetric in shape (although slightly skewed). The mode appears to decrease
monotonically with z. This result indicates that bids decrease with territory size and technological
progress since high positive values of z correspond to more recent years and larger territory sizes. In
addition, it is apparent that the variance of the bids decreases as z increases.
The knowledge of the bid functions allow us to construct the pseudo-sample of costs, using (9). We
nd that, for a given z, the estimated cost schedule l() is indeed an increasing function of the bids, as
required by proposition 116 . The conditional cost density functions presented in Figure 3 have a shape
quite similar to the conditional bid density functions (unimodal and slightly skewed). Figure 3 shows
that an increase in territory size and technological progress (everything else equal) leads to a reduction
in the mean and the variance of the cost of snow removal by private contractors. This may signal
the presence of unexploited economies of scale, returns to scale in the industry and unused capacity of
production.
5.2 Expected Bids and Costs
In Figure 4, we present the conditional expectation of costs and bids (estimated semiparametrically)
which highlight how the bids and the costs change with z. Since high positive values of z correspond to
more recent auctions and larger territory sizes, it appears that the combined inuence of the size of the
territory and technological progress has reduced the bids and the costs strongly at the beginning of the
period and at a slower pace afterwards. To separate the respective role of territory size and technological
progress we assess the relative sensitivity of z to length, distance, and technological progress. For that,
we go back to the construction of the single index z = x that aggregates the dimension of the contract
characteristics x (length, distance, technological progress). The coe¢ cients in ; are observationally
15The values of z are chosen along a grid of values constructed on [z; z]. We present the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile.
16Graphs of the l() functions are available upon request.
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equivalent to those in  up to scale normalization, and give the relative sensitivity of z to the vector x.
We have found b = (1:000; 4:037; 20:126): It follows that z is 20 times more sensitive to technological
progress than to the length of the territory, i.e. the e¤ect of technological progress that takes place
in one year is equivalent to an increase of 20 kilometers in the length of the territory. It suggests
that the increase in territory size alone does not explain much of the reduction in costs and bids. The
coe¢ cients of the single index also indicate that z is four times more sensitive to the distance to the
snow dump than to the length of the territory and therefore suggests that the reduction of price and
costs from larger territories is partially outweighed by an increase in the transportation cost to the
snow dump because larger territories imply larger distance to the snow dump17 . Moreover, it is very
likely that some technological progress has been induced by larger territory size. As a matter of fact,
increasing the territory size has forced rms that did not already use e¢ cient equipment to upgrade
their machinery in order to meet the deadlines imposed by the City to clear the school and hospital
areas. This interpretation is corroborated by results indicating that the variance of costs was larger at
the beginning of the period than at the end of the period.
The conjecture that the increase in territory size triggered technological progress is also reinforced by
Canadian multifactor productivity. On one hand, for the period 1988 to 2000, the annual growth rate of
multifactor productivity has been between 0.4% for business sector-services and 1.7% in manufacturing
17Another way to get some insights into the relative contributions of each factor would be to use our semiparametric
estimate of the conditional expectation of bids (see Figure 4) to choose a functional form for H and then reestimate
parametrically the conditional expectation of bids. We chose a quadratic form that seems quite close to the form given by
Figure 4 except for the inexion point that is not taken into account with a quadratic form. We found that b up to a scale
is equal to b = (1; 2:04; 4:01) and that the estimate of the function H is bH(z) = \E(p j z) = 11:52  0:29z+0:01z2 where
z = x = 1L + 2D + 3T . The parametrically estimated single index is quite di¤erent from the semiparametrically
estimated single index whose coe¢ cients are respectively (1,-4.04,20.13). It indicates that a quadratic function is not
exible enough to represent the function H. It also indicates that the following results derived from the parametric
estimation have to be interpreted with caution. The derivative of parametrically estimated conditional bids with respect
to territory size, distance and time are respectively -0.04, 0.43 and -0.41. Therefore, each additional kilometer of territory
size reduces the bid by 4 cents per meter of streets cleared of snow, while each year the growth in technical progress reduces
the bids by 41 cents per meter of snow clearing. Considering that the mean territory size increased by 7 kilometers between
1990 and 1995 and that the smallest territory (auctioned in 1990) was 23 kilometers shorter than the largest one (auctioned
in 1996), the price impact of changes in territory size has been moderate. As a matter of fact, if we compare the average
for the years 1995 and 1990, we nd that bids would have decreased by roughly $1.30 as the result of the 7 kilometer
increase in size of the average territory, the 4 years of technological progress and of the 1.45 kilometer increased distance
to the snow dump. Most of the decrease in bids came from technological progress since the increase in territory size cut
bids by only 28 cents while technological progress reduced bids by $1.64 over the four years (or roughly by 3.5% annually)
and the increase to the snow dump increased the bids by 62 cents. When comparing the average bids for these two years,
we nd that in fact bids have decreased by nearly $2, from $13.52/m to $11.53/m. Therefore, we explain 65% of that
reduction in bids with our least-squares estimates. In both cases -with the semiparametric and the parametric estimates-
technological progress explains most of the reduction in bids.
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industries according to a Statistics Canada survey18 . On the other hand, expected bids and costs
conditional on z have decreased by approximately 24% over our period of study19 . In other words, bids
and costs have diminished by roughly 4% a year following changes in z, nearly all of which came from
technological progress according to the coe¢ cients in our single index. This is much bigger than the
Canadian gures and suggests technological innovations beyond the "normal" exogenous technological
progress in the industry. In this sense, we can say that increasing the territory size has been a successful
policy, as shown in Figure 420 .
5.3 Informational Rents
It would be unwise to increase territory size if cost reductions were o¤set by increased rents due to
either lower competition or a larger variance of costs among potential suppliers. As shown in Figure
5, the informational rent21 earned by a contract winner is around 0.67 cents per meter of snow cleared
over the winter on average, or about 6.7% of the winners cost. Therefore, the cost of asymmetric
information turns out not to be excessive and its evolution is no cause for concern. The rent remained
relatively constant over the periods [1990-1992], [1993-1996] and [1997-1998] with respectively 0.70, 0.62
and 0.71 cents per meter. If we compare the rents for similar territories (put up to tender every four
years), we generally nd that the rent falls with the length of the territory22 . But factors such as a
change in reserve price or in the variance of costs of the potential bidders also a¤ect the rents. Both
have fallen and also explain the reduction in rent. The correlation between the estimated rent and the
18We used The Daily from Statistics Canada of Tuesday May 22, 2001 which presents data on multifactor productivity
for 1988-2000. The statistics have been computed using the matrices 9456-9458 and 9460-9483 in Cansim.
19When we estimate nonparametrically the conditional expectation of bids with respect to z, we nd a maximum of
13.26$/m at the beginning of the period and a minimum of 10.08$/m at the end of the period. For the conditional
expectation of costs with respect to z, the maximum at the begining of the period is 12.68$/m and the minimum at the
end of the period is 9.70 $/m. Therefore the expected bids and costs for the City have decreased by approximately 24%
over the period.
20The reduction of costs on all territories also suggests that rms were able to reap even more the benets of better
equipment on larger territories. It would therefore suggest that rms were able to enjoy returns to scale and maybe
increase their capacity of production toward full capacity for each territory.
21Figure 5 shows average winners bids and estimated winners costs over the sample period. The informational rent is
the area between these two curves.
22We have compared the year 1990 with the year 1995 when the 1990 contracts were renewed. Between these two dates,
the average territory size increased from 32 km to 39 km and the rents fell from 0.76$/m to 0.42$/m on average. When
we perform the same exercise for the years 1991 and 1996, and 1992 and 1997 respectively, we also nd in both cases
the territory size increased while rents dropped. Finally, between 1993 and 1998, the average rent decreased despite a
constant territory size.
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variance of cost is positive which is consistent with the theoretical model23 . Table 4 gives the average
of the winners informational rent in di¤erent periods, along with a number of auction characteristics.
The data has been grouped into three periods of three years each, except for the last period, which
includes only two years because it coincides with the end of the sample.24
5.4 Optimal Reserve Prices
The optimal reserve price, denoted pol should be chosen to minimize the expected cost to the buyer. It
allows to capture part of the informational rent that goes to the winner by restricting the number of
participants. It is dened by
pol = col  
F (pol j zl)
f(pol j zl)
(17)
where col is the cost to the City of Montreal to perform the activity itself. Since we dont know col; we
compute col from equation (17) assuming that the reserve prices are optimally chosen. We nd that the
implicit cost for the City col is nearly equal to the reserve price (with a di¤erence that does not exceed
1%) and is 14.4% higher than the average cost of the private suppliers (see Table 5). It indicates that
the cost of snow removal for taxpayers would increase by at least 14.4% if the City of Montreal was
not auctioning o¤ the services. The percentage di¤erence of how much it would cost the City and the
private suppliers varies between 6% and 48% (see Table 5). We can therefore conclude that the City
has a large comparative disadvantage on some territories25 .
Finally, these results suggest that if the Cost for the City is indeed consistently 14.4% higher on
average than its suppliers, the reserve prices are nearly optimally set over the whole period 1990-1998
and that the City has kept up successfully with the reduction of production cost26 . It is true that we
actually dont know if the City cost has indeed changed according to its supplier costs. However, it is
23When the rms are more alike, the variance of costs falls and the informational rent is reduced. We nd a positive
correlation of 0.59.
24As already mentioned, for historical reasons, no contracts were o¤ered in 1994, which explains why the 1993-1996
period is indeed a three year period contract.
25However, it is possible that the reserve prices are not optimally chosen. If the cost is on average less than 14.4%
higher for the City than for its suppliers, then the reserve prices should be lower. Otherwise they are too much binding
and ought to be increased.
26The reserve price depends on the cost of production of the City and not of the supplier costs. However, we have just
implicitly assumed that the supplier costs are very correlated with the City cost. As a matter of fact, both the City and
its suppliers have beneted from the same technological progress.
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likely that the gap between the City cost and its suppliers remained constant27 . As a matter of fact,
the City performs itself some of the activity and therefore has faced the same changes as its suppliers
over time.
6 Conclusion
We have evaluated the performance of snow removal procurement from data on bids, the number of
bidders and some of the characteristics of 457 contracts o¤ered for tender by the City of Montreal
between 1990 and 1998. Using nonparametric estimation techniques adapted from Guerre et al. [2000],
we were able to compute bid density functions conditional on contract characteristics, and to infer
the cost distributions of the rms that do contractual work for the City, as well as the informational
rents they earn. Both the bid and the cost densities are unimodal, and their means and variances
depend on contract characteristics. The latter have been summarized using a single index estimated
semiparametrically adapting the method of Powell et al. [1989] and therefore exploiting the relationship
between the bids and the characteristics.
Bids and costs have decreased over the sample period while informational rents remained relatively
constant. Our results were shown to be compatible with standard received theory of competitive
auctions: there is a positive correlation between costs and bids and rents increase with the variance of
costs.
Both the model and the techniques used to obtain the results rely on the assumption of perfect
competition. We did not adopt this assumption without some strong a priori indications that it was a
reasonable approximation of reality. We discussed the issue with City o¢ cials and private contractors
who, respectively, congratulated themselves and deplored that competition was strong. Moreover, the
City of Montréal (with a population of one million) is only one of several municipalities in an urban
community of three million people, that use the services of private entrepreneurs for snow removal. The
reservoir of entrepreneurs is even larger as their activities are not limited to snow removal. Firms as
27The City might have higher costs than its suppliers because it performs many activities and does not specialize
particularly in snow removal. Moreover, the City might face more constraints (in particular labour constraints) than its
suppliers.
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di¤erent as paving contractors, landscape contractors, lawn mowers, excavating and building rms can
provide snow removal services during the winter season by making minor additions to their equipment.
Finally, the data indicates that the number of actual bidders was consistently at around seven or eight,
in most auctions. Our results tend to conrm this a priori information: rents left in the hands of the
winning bidders were found to be consistently low over the sample period.
Although working hypotheses can always be challenged, we feel condent that our investigation of
policy issues is well-grounded. The evidence is that the City has e¤ectively exploited the opportunities
it had to reduce the cost of snow removal services. The bids for, and the underlying costs of, snow
removal have declined over the period 1990 to 1998. It appears that the City was not passive in that
process. Within the framework of competitive supply auctions, there were at least two basic ways in
which it was able to reduce the amount the taxpayer had to pay for snow removal services. First, it
organized the work in such a way as to reduce the cost of performing the service. The evidence suggests
that increasing territory size has triggered technological innovations beyond the "normal" exogenous
technological progress in the industry. Second, it dened the contracts so as to make the pool of bidders
more homogeneous, thus reducing cost variance and cutting the rent left in the hands of the winner.
There is some evidence that the cost variance was reduced over the sample period by making the
territories more homogeneous. Further the reserve prices appeared binding and have been decreased
adequately to keep up with the reduction in the cost of snow removal.
Several other aspects of the Citys procurement policies would be worth investigating. For example,
it is possible that the individual costs of private contractors are not entirely independent but might have
a common component due to meteorological forecasts or other factors. By stipulating how weather risks
are shared by the City and the contractors, the City might inuence the bidding. Another interesting
auction management question would be to ask whether the City should keep for itself any territory for
snow removal or whether it should contract all of them to the private sector. Finally, we could investigate
whether the snow clearance and its transportation should be a joint or two separate procurements put
up for auction. We leave that for further work.
We acknowledge the support of SSHRC. The rst author also thanks CIRANO for its nancial
support during part of the completion of this work.
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Appendix: Construction of the Single Index
We use a single index model to take into account the heterogeneity across the tracts as we explained
before. We present our choices for the kernel bandwidth and the optimal bandwidth hereafter following
Härdle and Tsybakov (1993) and Powell and Stocker (1996). The order of the kernel (denoted P) should
be even and should be a function of the number of variables (denoted k) that need to be aggregated.
More specically28
P  (k + 3)
2
We use the kernel of order 4 developed by Gasser, Mueller and Mammitzsch (1985):
K(u) =
105
64
 (1  5  u2 + 7  u4   3  u6)1I (juj  1)
The asymptotically optimal bandwidth has the form
h = h0L
 2=(2P+k+2) = h0L 1=6:5
We will use a plug-in estimator of the optimal bandwidth as described in Powell and Stocker (1996) but
we have to adapt the formulae for our case where the number of bids di¤er from auction to auction.
The estimator of the vector h0 is
h0 =
"
(k + 2) bQ
P bS2
#1=(2P+k+2)
=
"
5 bQ
4bS2
#1=13
(18)
where with the same notation as before the component q=1,2,3 of Q denoted by a superscript is given
by
cQq = 2
L(L  1) 
1
(h1L)(h
2
L)(h
3
L)
L 1X
l=1
1
nl
Max(nl )X
i=1
LX
j=l+1
264K 0(xql   xqjhqL ) 
3Y
m=1
m6=q
K(
xml   xmj
hmL
)  (bil   bij)
375
2
28See Härdle and Tsybakov page 36, assumptions A1 and A2 .
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and
bS = (hn1)  (hn1)
(hn1)P   (hn1)P
where  is a positive number di¤erent from 1 (we choose 2) and (hn1) is the estimator of  obtained
with the bandwidth hn1. The vector hn1 must satisfy proposition 4.2 of Powell and Stocker and must
be such that
lim
L!1
hL = 0 and lim
L!1
L  (hL)c =1 with c = max( + 2k + 4; 2P + k + 2) for  > 0
We choose  = 1 and then we have c = 13: The initial value for the bandwidth hL satises the above
condition29 and is equal to hL = stdc(x)  L 1=26 = (0:854; 0:854; 0:854): Using the formulae (18), we
nd for the optimal bandwidth h = (1:414; 1:298; 1:173): Our estimator of the single index will then be
a consistent estimator of  and L1=2(b   ) is asymptotically normally distributed with mean 0. The
estimator  of the single index up to a scale is found to be equal to b = (1:000; 4:037; 20:126).
Choice of Kernels and Bandwidths for the Estimation of the Densities and Distributions of Bids and
Costs
The choice of the kernel does not really matter as long as the kernel is dened on a compact support
and is di¤erentiable on its support. We choose the biweight kernel
K(u) =
15
16
(1  u2)21I(juj  1)
The choice of a bandwidth requires, however, more attention. In particular, a too large bandwidth
tends to oversmooth the estimated density, while a too small bandwidth tends to undersmooth the
estimated density. Moreover, a large bandwidth tends to increase the bias of the estimator while a
small bandwidth tends to increase its variance. Finally, the bandwidths dene the uniform consistency
rate of the estimators. Let L = 61 be the number of auctions. We assume that the density f() admit
R bounded continuous derivatives. Because the kernel function has to be of order R + 1, we assume
29Therefore, we allow hL to converge to 0 at a di¤erent rate than the optimal bandwidth as required in Powell and
Stocker (page 311).
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R = 1. The biweight kernel is of order 2. The bandwidths are of the following form for the rst and
second step of our estimator
hG = 2:778z(61)
 1=5; hgp = 2:778p(457) 1=6;
hgz = hfz = 2:778z(L)
 1=6; hfp = 2:778c(457) 1=6;
The constants are determined by the so-called rule of thumb. Namely, the constants are equal to
2:623  1:06^, where ^ is the empirical standard deviation of observations. The factor 2.623 is a
correction due to the use of a biweight kernel instead of a Gaussian kernel (see Hardle (1991) for more
information on bandwidths choice). We nd the following values for the bandwidths
hG = 24:34 ; hgp = 1:50 ; hgz = hfz = 27:92 ; hfc = 1:52
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Table 1: Auction Data Summary 1
Year
Average
of All
Bids
($/m)
Average
Winning
Bid
($/m)
Average
Territory
Size
(m)
Average
Distance
to Snow Dump
(km)
Average
Number
of Actual
Bidders
1990 13.52 12.11 31,920 2.35 5.25
1991 12.64 11.57 31,114 2.65 8.87
1992 11.62 11.05 34,507 3.18 8.17
1993 11.51 10.13 32,477 2.27 6.67
1994 29    
1995 11.53 10.32 38,940 3.80 7.00
1996 10.49 10.01 37,534 3.04 6.00
1997 10.12 9.37 36,173 3.67 10.83
1998 10.07 9.46 32,137 2.93 6.67
Table 2: Auction Data Summary 2
Year
Number
of
Contracts
Number
of Actual
Bidders
1990 8 42
1991 15 133
1992 6 49
1993 3 20
1994  
1995 8 56
1996 12 72
1997 6 65
1998 3 20
Table 3: Overall Statistics
Variables Mean Std Error Min. Max. # of Obs.
Bids (in $/m) 11.62 1.50 8.40 16.49 457
Costs (in $/m) 11.15 1.52 5.88 14.31 457
Winning Bids (in $/m) 10.73 1.18 8.40 12.88 61
# of Actual Bidders per Auction 7.49 2.42 2 14 61
29No auction was organized in 1994.
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Table 4: Chronological Evolution of The Variables Under Study
1990-1992 1993-1996 1997-1998
Mean of Winners Bid ($=m) 11.61 10.13 9.4
Mean of Winners Cost ($=m) 10.91 9.51 8.69
Mean of Winners Rent ($=m) 0.70 0.62 0.71
Mean of Actual Number of Bidders 7.72 6.43 9.44
Variance of Costs 0.87 0.68 0.54
Mean of Size of Territory (km) 32.4 37.4 34.8
Contracts (7 25km) 7 25km > 25km > 25km
Table 5: City Cost Data Summary (Assuming Reserve Prices are Optimally Chosen)
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Cost to the City
minus
Cost to the Suppliers
0.144 0.065 0.057 0.485
Cost to the City
minus
Reserve Price
0.005 0.001 0.002 0.008
Figure 1: Single Index
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Figure 2: Densities of Bids for the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile
Figure 3: Densities of Costs for the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile
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Figure 4: Conditional Expected Bids and Costs with Respect to Z
Figure 5: Mean of Winner Bids and Pseudo-Costs
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